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1 Introduction
The present paper clarifies the concept of context commonly
acknowledged in semantics and pragmatics, and then provides a
different interpretation of context: the context is indicated and
specified by the speaker's performance of an illocutionary act and the
addressee's uptake／response. On the basis of this interpretation, we
explain what the context is, and, while doing so, tackle some
interpretational and ontological issues related to the notion of the
context.
The commonly acknowledged concept of context is a particular
context in which a sentence is uttered. The information of the
context specifies (i) the referents of indexical／deictic expressions of
the sentence, and (ii) the interpretation of a part or the whole of the
sentence, i.e., the interpretation of what is said. If this interpretation
of context is correct, then the aim of study of context is basically to
describe (i) how idiosyncrasies of a particular context, such as the
speaker, the hearer, the time and the place, provide the referents of
indexical expressions, and (ii) how idiosyncrasies of a context as a
particular communicative situation affect the interpretation of the
sentence.
We provide a different interpretation of context: the context
is a situation which is indicated and specified by the speaker's
performance of an illocutionary act as a communicative move to the
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addressee, to which the addressee reacts in one way or another. We
also claim that specifying a particular illocutionary act involves
specifying the characteristics of the context in this sense. That is,
to specify the present act as a particular illocutionary act of
commissive such as promising is, at least partially, to specify the
circumstances in the present context as those of promising, and this
specification might or might not be accepted by the addressee. If
this hypothesis is correct, we can clarify at least some elements of
the context by describing the circumstances specified by
illocutionary acts.
We develop our argument in the following order. In the
following section, Section 2, we clarify the well acknowledged
concept of context through examining the issue of context
sensitivity. We firstly discuss context sensitivity in the sense that
contextual information specifies the referents of indexical／deictic
expressions, which contributes to the propositional／truth
conditional content of the sentence. Secondly, we discuss the
context sensitivity in the sense that contextual information
specifies the interpretation of the sentence uttered. We then
explain criticisms of contextualism by Cappelen and Lepore (2005),
and clarify the sense of contextualism used by them. In Section 3,
we propose a different interpretation of contextualism. We
introduce what we call an Austinian speech act theory" (Austin
1962a), which stands in opposition to standard speech act theory
post Austin (Searle 1969, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1989, Searle and
Vanderveken 1985, and Back and Harnish 1979). Accordingly, we
describe context and its elements specified by successful
illocutionary acts. Contextualism in this sense is the doctrine that
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describes how the speech situation is clarified or changed by the
speaker's act, and what meaning is expressed in the clarified／
changed speech situation. A short conclusion follows.
2 Context sensitivity
2.1 Indeterminacy of the propositional content: indexical／deictic
expressions
Context sensitivity, a well discussed issue of context, is generally
interpreted as the issue of indeterminacy of the propositional／truth
conditional content of a sentence: the propositional／truth conditional
content of a sentence cannot be determined without some contextual
information. Typical examples are in the following:
(1) a. You, you, but not you, are dismissed,
b. Not that one, idiot, that one. (Levinson 1983: 66)
To determine the propositional／truth conditional content of a
sentence with an indexical／deictic expression, such as you' and that',
one has to specify a particular person／object referred to by the
expression, and this is done by examining idiosyncrasies of the
particular situation in which the sentence is uttered. To determine
the propositional／truth conditional content of the sentence in (1a),
the referent of you', i.e., a particular person the speaker addresses in
this situation, should be identified. Similarly, to determine the
propositional content of the sentence in (1b), the salient object
the speaker refers to by that' in this situation should be identified.
This is based on the assumption that there is a particular speech
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situation at a certain spatio temporal location the speaker shares
with the addressee, and, because of this sharing, the speaker can
refer to a particular person／object or a particular time／place by an
indexical／deictic expression. By you', the speaker refers to a
particular person as the person she addresses, by that', the speaker
refers to a particular object as a salient object which is not close to
the speaker's location, and by now', the speaker refers to a particular
time as the time of utterance, and so on. The example (1a) shows
that the speaker can change the individual she addresses in a
second, and the example (1b) shows it is possible that conversational
participants sharing the speech situation misunderstand each other.
If context sensitivity is interpreted in this way, determining the
propositional／truth conditional content of a sentence with an
indexical／deictic expression is not essentially a syntactic semantic
process. Of course, as is shown by the distinction between I' and
we', this' and that', and here' and there', a certain linguistic
categorization is involved, but which person／object or time／location
is referred to by an indexical／deictic expression is determined by
idiosyncratic nature of the speech situation. Ian Smith, for example,
is referred to by you' because he happens to be the person addressed
by the speaker in this speech situation, and the lamp on the table is
referred to by that' because it happens to be a salient object in this
speech situation. That is, communication of this type is time bound
and space bound. One cannot identify the referent of an indexical／
deictic expression when s／he is away from the spatio temporal
location where the sentence is uttered.
The concept of context which is revealed by the discussion of
context sensitivity in this sense is a particular context: a particular
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speech situation with all idiosyncrasies in which a sentence is uttered.
Because of the idiosyncratic nature of the context, together with the
linguistic invention of indexical／deictic expressions which refer to
those idiosyncrasies, a specific meaning, which is particular to a
certain context, is expressed. Without this idiosyncratic information,
the person who is outside of this context cannot identify the truth
conditional content of the sentence. If this is all about context
sensitivity which concerns indexical／deictic expressions, it only
shows a linguistic deficit: a sentence with an indexical／deictic
expression does not or cannot express a complete proposition／
truth condition. Is this really true? We will come back to this point
in Section 3.
2.2 Indeterminacy of the propositional／truth conditional content: what
is said
There is another sense of context sensitivity. Consider the following
examples:
(2) a. I've had breakfast,
b. You are not going to die. (Recanati 2004: 8)
According to Recanati (2004), when the speaker utters the sentence
in (2a), she means more than the proposition that the speaker herself
has had breakfast before the time of utterance. Similarly, when the
speaker utters the sentence in (2b), she does not mean that the
addressee will not die as if he is immortal. The speaker rather means
something more specific. By uttering the sentence in (2a), the
speaker means that she has had breakfast on that very day, and by
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uttering the one in (2b), the speaker means that the addressee is not
going to die from a particular injury or disease, say, from the cut.
Recanati describes these specific propositions as actual truth
conditions, which contrast with literal truth conditions. To explain
the distinction between actual truth conditions and literal truth
conditions, Recanati uses other examples as well such as It's raining",
The table is covered with books", John has three children" and
Everybody went to Paris" (Recanati 2004: 8). The one similar to
the last example is discussed in Gauker (2003), which we explain
next.
Gauker says that the following sentence expresses different
propositions depending on different domains of discourse:
(3) Everyone is present. (Gauker 2003: 11)
According to Gauker (2003: 11 12), if the domain of discourse is
students still enrolled in a course, the proposition expressed is
the one that every student still enrolled in the course is present, and
if the domain of discourse is students who have been attending
recently, the proposition expressed is the one that every student who
has been attending recently is present. Gauker (2003: 11 12) lists
other types of context sensitivity, some of which we discussed in the
previous section of 2.1. The list includes indexical reference ( I am
sick"), demonstrative reference ( That one is nice"), incompleteness
( Mary is too tired"), lexical ambiguity ( Right" as a response to the
question Should I turn left?"), logical ambiguity ( Every rhyme is not
a poem") and grammatical ambiguity ( Hitchhikers may be escaping
convicts").
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Why are these described as cases of context sensitivity? It is
because in a certain situation the speaker and the addressee
understand a more specific proposition than the literal truth
condition of the sentence uttered. Context in this sense is a particular
situation in which the speaker and the addressee share the
interpretation of which proposition is expressed. That is, we can
hypothesize not only a speech situation in which the speaker and the
addressee understand the meaning of constituent words of a sentence
and their grammatical composition, i.e., a literal meaning of the
sentence, but a speech situation in which the speaker and the
addressee understand a more specific interpretation of the sentence,
i.e., what is said. The speech situation in the latter sense is the
situation in which the speaker and the addressee share the
understanding of the present discourse, which include participants'
roles, a topic and a purpose of communication, and assumptions
about the present speech situation and the world.
How is this concept of context different from the one we
discussed in the previous section, i.e., the context which specifies
the referent of an indexical／deictic expression? Let us call, for
convenience, the context which specifies the referent of an
indexical／deictic expression the deictic context, and the context
which specifies the interpretation of what is said the discourse
context. The deictic context is a particular speech situation at a
certain spatio temporal location where the speaker and the addressee
exist, and context sensitivity of the deictic context means that
idiosyncratic nature of this speech situation determines the content
of the sentence uttered. The discourse context, on the other hand,
is a particular communicative situation between the speaker and the
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addressee, where a particular interpretation of the propositional／
truth conditional content of a sentence is given. Context sensitivity
of the discourse context means that communicative circumstances of
a particular speech situation determine the interpretation of the
sentence uttered.
Contextualism is a label given to the doctrine which accepts the
discourse context in this sense, and supports the idea that
communicative circumstances of a particular speech situation
specify the interpretation of the propositional／truth conditional
content of a sentence: the interpretation of what is said (Recanati
2004 and Back 1994; also as explicature in Relevance Theory, Sperber
& Wilson 1995 and Carston 2002). The contextualism in this sense
is called into question by Cappelen and Lepore (2005). We discuss
their criticism in the following section.
2.3 Criticism of contextualism: Cappelen and Lepore (2005)
Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 1) present a list of expressions which
Kaplan (1989: 489) calls indexicals. The list includes the personal
pronouns I', you', she', it' in their various cases and number, the
demonstrative pronouns that' and this' in their various cases
and number, the adverbs here', there', now', today', yesterday',
tomorrow', ago' (as in He left two days ago"), hence(forth)' (as in
There will be no talking henceforth"), and the adjectives actual'
and present'. Cappelen and Lepore add to the list words and
aspects of words that indicate tense, and contextuals which include
common nouns like enemy', outsider', foreigner', alien', immigrant',
friend', and native', as well as common adjectives like foreign',
local', domestic', national', imported', and exported' (cf., Vallee 2003;
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Nunberg 1992; Condoravdi and Gawron 1995; Partee 1989). They call
this set of expressions the Basic Set of Context Sensitive Expressions,
and, according to them, it is the set of genuinely context sensitive
expressions.
Cappelen and Lepore recognize only a few context sensitive
expressions, i.e., those in the Basic Set of Context Sensitive
Expressions, and acknowledge a very limited effect of the context
of utterance on the semantic content. They claim that all semantic
context sensitivity is grammatically (i.e., syntactically and
morphemically) triggered, and that, beyond fixing the semantic
value of these obviously context sensitive expressions, the context
of utterance has no effect on the proposition semantically expressed.
They call these principles of analysis as Semantic Minimalism
(Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 2 3).
Semantic Minimalism is complemented by what they call Speech
Act Pluralism. It is summarized as follows:
No one thing is said (or asserted, or claimed, or …) by any
utterance: rather, indefinitely many propositions are said,
asserted, claimed, stated. What is said (asserted, claimed,
etc.) depends on a wide range of facts other than the
proposition semantically expressed. It depends on a
potentially indefinite number of features of the context of
utterance and of the context of those who report on (or think
about) what was said by the utterance (Cappelen and
Lepore 2005: 4).
As proponents of Semantic Minimalism, Capplen and Lepore
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criticize what they call Radical Contextualism (RC), which supports
the idea that every single expression is context sensitive, and also
what they call Moderate Contextualism (MC), whose proponents
claim many expressions which are not included in the Basic Set of
Context Sensitive Expressions are context sensitive. Cappelen and
Lepore take the following strategy to dispute these contextualisms.
They claim (i) any argument for MC inevitably slips into an
argument for RC (Chapter 3 6), and that (ii) RC is empirically
flawed, and ultimately incoherent (Chapter 7 9). They conclude that,
since MC collapses into RC, MC also is both empirically flawed and
ultimately incoherent. We briefly discuss the major points of their
arguments concerning (i) and (ii).
Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 40) take the Moderate Contextualist
argument for context sensitivity as the claim that what is said by
utterance u of sentence S containing context sensitive expression e
need not be the same as what is said by another utterance u' of S.
Cappelen and Lepore then claim that a context sensitivity argument
can be provided for any sentence whatsoever, and consequently for
any expression. They use the following sentence to show that the
utterance of a sentence without any context sensitive expression can
be interpreted differently depending on the context:
(4) That's a dangerous dog. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 46)
An utterance u of sentence (4) in one context is true only if the dog
is aggressive and initiates acts that put people in danger; another
utterance u' of the sentence (4) in another context, where the dog
has a viral disease, is true only if the dog can have detrimental
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consequences; and another utterance u" of the sentence (4) in another
context, where a group of people toss dead dogs at each other, is
true if the dead dog is heavy and stiff and, hence, harmful.
Cappelen and Lepore also criticize the Moderate Contextualist
argument for incompleteness. Consider the following example:
(5) Steel isn't strong enough. (Back 1994: 268)
Back (1994: 269) says that unless sentence (5) is completed by adding
a propositional component that specifies what steel is strong
enough for, all we have is a propositional fragment, or what Back
calls a propositional radical. If so, Cappelen and Lepore claim, the
following sentence is also incomplete:
(6) John went to the gym. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 64)
Although this sentence does not have any context sensitive
expression, it is incomplete because we can ask: went to the gym
how? Walked to the vicinity? Did something in the gym? Did what
in the gym? For how long? What if he went into the gym but was
sleepwalking? Etc." (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 64 65)
Making these points, Cappelen and Lepore show that a perfectly
ordinary, non indexical sentence can be context sensitive and
incomplete in the same sense in which Moderate Contextualists
use these terms of context sensitive" and incomplete" in their
arguments. This strongly indicates that any sentence and any
expression are potentially context sensitive and incomplete, which
is the claim Radical Contextualists make. That is, the arguments
― ―27
for MC slip into arguments for RC. The target of Cappelen and
Lepore's criticism is now RC.
First, Cappelen and Lepore say that only expressions in the Basic
Set of Context Sensitive Expressions pass context sensitivity tests.
As one of those tests, they discuss inter contextual disquotational
indirect reports: a context sensitive expression typically blocks this
type of report. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 88) Consider the
following example:
(7) a. Utterance made by George Bush, June 3, 2003: I wasn't
ready yesterday",
b. Utterance made by Lepore, June 5, 2003: Bush said that
I wasn't ready yesterday". (Cappelen and Lepore 2005:
89)
Lepore's report in (7b) is false because his use of I' and yesterday'
fails to pick out the same person and day Bush picked out using these
words. This is because these words are context sensitive, and pick
out the person and the day which are relative to the context in which
they are used. In (7a) I' is the speaker of the utterance made by
George Bush, i.e., George Bush, and, in (7b), I' is the speaker of the
utterance made by Ernie Lepore, i.e., Ernie Lepore, although the
subject of the main clause is Bush.
Imagine the sentence, John is ready", is uttered in two different
contexts. Context 1: in a conversation about exam preparation,
someone raises the question of whether John is well prepared, and
Nina says, John is ready". Context 2: three people are about to
leave an apartment; they are getting dressed for heavy rain, and
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Nina says, John is ready". This sentence does not block an inter
contextual disquotational indirect report. In saying Nina said that
John is ready", you can report these two utterances made by Nina:
you report on her utterance in C1, and on her utterance in C2.
(8) a. Nina said that John is ready,
b. Nina said that John is ready,
c. In both C1 and C2, Nina said that John is ready.
(Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 91)
According to Cappelen and Lepore, these examples show that ready'
is not a context sensitive expression because its interpretation is
not affected in inter contextual disquotational indirect reports. I'
and yesterday' and others in the Basic Set of Context Sensitive
Expressions would take a wrong referent in inter contextual
disquotational indirect reports.
As another indicator of context sensitivity, Cappelen and
Lepore (2004: 105) observe that e is context sensitive only if there
are (or can be) false utterances of S" even though S1. Imagine the
situation where I refer to a French woman, Silvie, and say She is
French", and someone, say, John, mistakenly refers to a Japanese
woman, Anna, and says She is French". One of the utterances of
― ―29
1 Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 105 106) give the following examples:
(1) There is (or can be) a false utterance of She is French" even
thought she is French.
(2) There is a false utterance of That's nice" even thought that's nice
[said pointed at Al's car].
(3) There is a false utterance of I'm hungry" even thought I am
hungry.
the sentence She is French" is false (since Anna is Japanese, not
French), even though she is French (because I refer to Silvie, and
she is French). This test shows that there are two distinct contexts
for uttering She is French", and in one context a proposition that
Silvie is French is expressed and it is true, while in another context
a different proposition that Anna is French is expressed and it is
false. That is, there are two distinct contexts for uttering the
sentence, where two different propositions／truth conditions are
expressed: the sentence has two distinct truth values.
Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 107) call the Storytelling Context the
context in which a Context Shifting Argument (CSA) is told, and
the Target Context the context about which a CSA is told. They
claim that a sentence with an indexical expression included in the
Basic Set is used in its Storytelling. Imagine, for example, in a
Storytelling Context X, I tell (i) a story about Target Context 1,
where I make a true statement that she, Silvie, is French, and (ii)
a story about Target Context 2, where John makes a false statement
that she, Anna, is French. In the Storytelling Context X, I use the
word she" to refer to two different individuals, Silvie in Target
Context 1, and Anna in Target Context 2, and utter the sentence to
express two distinctive propositions, Silvie is French, which is true,
and Anna is French, which is false.
According to Cappelen and Lepore, the sentences the
Contextualists utilize in their context sensitivity argument are not
used. Imagine Storytelling Context Y, where two Target Contexts for
uttering the sentence in (9) are explained: Target Context 1, where
I refer to Osama bin Laden and say that he is tall for a Saudi
Arabian, and Target Context 2, where John refers to Osama bin
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Laden and says that he is tall for an NBS basketball player.
(9) Osama bin Laden is tall.
According to Cappelen and Lepore, Contextualists are trying to make
us believe the utterance of the sentence (9) in Target Context 1 is
true because Osama bin Laden is tall for a Saudi Arabian, while the
utterance of the sentence (9) in the Target Context 2 is false because
he is not tall for an NBA player. However, Cappelen and Lepore
claim, when these utterances are explained in the Storytelling
Context Y, the sentence Osama bin Laden is tall" is not used with
two distinct senses, i.e., Osama bin Laden is tall for a Saudi Arabian"
and Osama bin Laden is tall for an NBA player". That is, when I
tell stories of Target Context 1 and 2 in the Storytelling Context Y,
I do not use the sentence (9) while differentiating the sense of tall
for a Saudi Arabian" from the one of tall for an NBA player"; so I
do not express different propositions. On the basis of this analysis,
Cappelen and Lepore claim that two utterances of the sentence,
Osama bin Laden is tall", do not express two distinct propositions
depending on the topic of conversation, i.e., the topic of the height
of Saudi Arabians, or that of the height of NBA players. They,
therefore, conclude that tall' is not a context sensitive expression.
Another objection to Radical Contextualism is, according to
Cappelen and Lepore, is that it makes communication impossible:
The objection we raise . . . is certainly not original with us;
its variations go back at least to Frege. The simple idea is
this: If RC were true, it would be miraculous if people ever
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succeeded in communicating across diverse contexts of
utterance. But there are no miracles; people do succeed in
communicating across diverse contexts of utterance with
boring regularity. So RC isn't true. (Cappelen and Lepore
2005: 123)
Every context is different and, if, as Radical Contextualists claim,
every expression is context sensitive, it is very difficult to imagine
how people communicate with each other. Radical Contextualists
have to explain how people succeed in doing this.
In the following section, we discuss how we should take
Cappelen and Lepore's objections to Contexualisms.
2.4 A reply to Cappelen and Lepore's objections to Contextualisms
First of all let us examine the sense of sentence meaning in which
Cappelen and Lepore develop their arguments against Contexualisms.
Since they advocate Speech Act Pluralism, which complements
Semantic Minimalism, it is unlikely that they discuss the sense of a
sentence uttered as an illocutionary act. We, however, need a
scrutiny.
In the discussion of inter contextual disquotational indirect
report, Cappelen and Lepore say Nina's utterances of John is ready"
in two contexts, one in the discussion of the exam preparation
(Context 1), and the other in the discussion of the preparation for
going out (Context 2), can be reported by Nina said that John is
ready" despite of the difference in context. If we interpret Nina's
utterances of John is ready" as illocutionary acts, however, they
are reported differently depending on the context. If Nina says, John
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is ready" in Context 2, where uncertainty of John's joining is raised,
you can report Nina's utterance by saying Nina said (or asserted)
that John is coming". However, when you report Nina's utterance
John is ready" in the discussion of the exam preparation in Context
2, obviously you cannot report it by saying Nina said (or asserted)
that John is coming".
Cappelen and Lepore claim that when two utterances of Osama
bin Laden is tall", one in the discussion of the height of Saudi
Arabians and the other in the discussion of the height of NBA
players, are explained in the Storytelling Context, the sentence
Osama bin Laden is tall" is not used with two distinct senses,
i.e., Osama bin Laden is tall for a Saudi Arabian" and Osama bin
Laden is tall for an NBA player". When the sentence is uttered as
an illocutionary act, however, the sentence with a specific sense can
be explained in the Storytelling Context. Imagine Target Context
1, where Nina says John is tall" in the discussion of the possibility of
hiring him as a police officer2. The illocutionary act performed is a
verdictive, which consist[s] in the delivering of a finding, official or
unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact, so far as these
are distinguishable." (Austin 1962a: 153) That is, Nina, in uttering
John is tall" in this circumstance, asserts an evidence for hiring
John, i.e., John is tall for a police officer. In Storytelling Context Z, I
can explain Nina's utterance of John is tall" in Target Context 1 in
saying According to Nina, John is tall and will be a good police
officer", in which I definitely use the word tall" in the sense of tall
for police officers".
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2 I appreciate Yuji Nishiyama's useful comment concerning this point.
These show that Cappelen and Lepore's analyses do not apply
to meanings of sentences when they are used as illocutionary acts.
So let us assume that their analyses are based on sentence meaning
in a locutionary sense: in particular, a rhetic' act, rather than a
phonetic' or phatic' act. Austin explains the distinction among these
three locutionary acts as follows:
… to say anything is
(A. a) always to perform the act of uttering certain noises
(a phonetic' act), and the utterance is a phone;
(A. b) always to perform the act of uttering certain
vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types
belonging to and as belonging to a certain
vocabulary, in a certain construction, i.e. conforming
to and as conforming to a certain grammar, with a
certain intonation, &c. This act we may call a
phatic' act, and the utterance which it is the act of
uttering a pheme' (as distinct from the phememe
of linguistic theory); and
(A. c) generally to perform the act of using that pheme
or its constituents with a certain more or less
definite sense' and a more or less definite reference'
(which together are equivalent to meaning'). This
act we may call a rhetic' act, and the utterance
which it is the act of uttering a rheme'. (Austin
1962a: 92 93)
Nina's utterances of John is ready" in two contexts can be reported
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by Nina said that John is ready", when the utterances are taken as
rhetic acts. The problem with rhetic acts, however, is that sense
and reference are only more or less definite". Austin says:
. . . the rhetic act is the one we report, in the case of assertions,
by saying He said that the cat was on the mat', He said he
would go', He said I was to go' (his words were You are to
go'). This is the so called indirect speech'. If the sense or
reference is not being taken as clear, then the whole or part
is to be in quotation marks. Thus I might say: He said I was
to go to the minister", but he did not say which minister' or
I said that he was behaving badly and he replied that the
higher you get the fewer"'. (Austin 1962a: 96 97)
When a less definite sense is allowed for the word ready", Nina's
utterances of John is ready" in two contexts can be reported as
Nina said that John is ready (on both occasions)". However, when
a more specific sense of the word ready" is required, these utterances
are reported as Nina said that (on one occasion) John is ready for
the exam and (on another occasion) John is ready to go out", rather
than being reported by the same sentence, Nina said that John is
ready".
Imagine, as a similar case, you overheard Nina saying John is
ready" on two different occasions. Not knowing which individual
was referred to by John" in each case, you might be able to report
them by saying, Nina said that John was ready (on both occasions)"
or Nina said that John' was ready (on both occasions)"3. This is
possible if a far less definite reference of the word John' is allowed.
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This does not guarantee, however, that one and the same semantic
content is expressed by John is ready" on both occasions.
Let us think again of two utterances of Osama bin Laden is tall":
one in the discussion of the height of Saudi Arabians and the other
in the discussion of the height of NBA players. Because of the nature
of a rhetic act, it is questionable if you should report those utterances
by saying He said that Osama bin Laden is tall' (in both cases), but
I didn't know what he meant by tall' (in each case)",
just as you say He said John was at the bank' (in both cases), but
I didn't know what he meant by bank' (in each case)". In this
interpretation, a rigid sense of tall" is required even for a rhetic
act, and its absence is marked by quotation marks. Taking the
sense of the word tall" much less rigidly, you might report those
utterances by saying He said that Osama bin Laden is tall (in both
cases)". Both the sentence with the rigid sense and the one with the
less rigid sense seem to express a meaning. We are happy to say the
sentence (9), which we cite here again, expresses a meaning both
when it means that Osama bin Laden is tall as a Saudi Arabian,
and when it means that Osama bin Laden is tall without specifying
the sense of tall":
(9) Osama bin Laden is tall.
Having this in mind, let us move on to the discussion of Cappelen
and Lepore's objections to RC (Radical Contextualism). In the
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3 This point was made by Marina Sbis during the discussion in One
day Workshop on Contextualism at Fuji Women's University in 2006.
preceding section, we explained two points. The first point is that
expressions other than those included in the Basic Set of Context
Sensitive Expressions do not pass context sensitivity tests. The
second point is that if, as Radical Contextualists claim, every
expression is context sensitive, it is difficult to imagine how people
succeed in communicating with each other, despite the fact that
they actually do.
Firstly, Cappelen and Lepore claim that alleged context sensitive
expressions, such as ready' or 'tall', do not seem to pass context
sensitivity tests, while context sensitive expressions included in the
Basic Set of Context Sensitive Expressions do. However, as we
discussed above, Cappelen and Lepore build their arguments
assuming that the semantic content of a sentence is the meaning
expressed when the sentence is uttered as a rhetic act, where a
less rigid sense and a less specific reference are allowed. Therefore, if
we interpret the semantic content of a sentence differently, such as
the meaning expressed by the utterance as (i) an illocutionary act
or (ii) a rhetic act with a rigid sense and a specific reference, their
arguments do not apply.
For example, the context sensitivity arguments of the sentences
in (2) do apply when they are interpreted as an illocutionary act.
When asked if she is hungry, in uttering the sentence in (2a), the
speaker declines, as a behabitive4 illocutionary act, the offer of
food. This makes applicable the interpretation of the sentence
meaning that the speaker has had breakfast on that day. Imagine,
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4 Austin (1962a: 160) says Behabitives include the notion of reaction to
other people's behaviour and fortunes and of attitudes and expressions
of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or imminent conduct".
similarly, that in uttering the sentence in (2b), the speaker expresses,
as a verdictive5 illocutionary act, her judgment that the cut／injury is
not serious. This makes possible the interpretation of the sentence
meaning that the addressee is not going to die from the cut／injury.
(2) a. I've had breakfast,
b. You are not going to die. (Recanati 2004: 8 10)
It is also possible to assume the semantic context of a sentence
as the meaning expressed when the sentence is uttered as a rhetic
act in which a rigid sense and a specific reference are required.
When the speaker utters the following sentence,
(10) Here's a red one (apple), (Bezuidenhout 2002: 107)
the semantic content might be taken as Here's an apple which
has red flesh" rather than Here is an apple with a red skin"
(Bezuidenhour 2002: 107)6.
Another related point is that, since Cappelen and Lepore take
the semantic content of a sentence in a restricted sense, they take its
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5 Austin (1962a: 153).
6 It is also possible to interpret the semantic context of this sentence as
the meaning expressed by the utterance as an illocutionary act. In the
situation where the speaker sorts through a barrel of apples to find
those that have been afflicted by a fungal disease which stains the
flesh of the apple red, in uttering the sentence, the speaker performs
a verdictive illocutionary act: the speaker expresses her judgment that
here is, or she has found, an apple which has been afflicted by the
disease and has red flesh. See Bezuidenhout (2002: 107).
context sensitivity in a restricted sense as well. However, as we
explained in Section 2.2, there are two different concepts of context,
the deictic context and the discourse context, and also two senses of
context sensitivity which correspond to either concept of context.
Let us explain again and elaborate these two concepts of context
and corresponding senses of context sensitivity.
The deictic context is a particular speech situation at a certain
spatio temporal location where the speaker and the addressee
exist, and context sensitivity of the deictic context means that the
idiosyncratic nature of this speech situation determines the content
of the sentence uttered. For example, since Ian Smith happens to be
a person addressed in a particular speech situation, the referent of the
pronoun you' is Ian Smith. In other words, since the speaker shares
with the addressee a certain spatio temporal location, she specifies
(i) a certain person relative to her／his speech role in the present
speech situation, such as the speaker, the hearer, or the third person,
(ii) a certain object relative to its salience in the present speech
situation, and (iii) a certain time／place relative to the spatio
temporal location of the present speech situation. The context
change in this sense means the change of the spatio temporal
location where communication takes place. So, if the propositional／
truth conditional content of the sentence includes one of these
elements of the deictic context, such as participants and their roles,
salient objects, and the physical／temporal location, then the
propositional content changes considerably from one deictic context
to another. This is one sense of context sensitivity.
The discourse context is a particular communicative situation
between the speaker and the addressee, which is a purely
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communicative situation, and characteristics of this situation, which
include the topic and goal of communication, and shared
assumptions, shape what the speaker says. For example, imagine the
discourse context between a university lecturer and students in her
lecture course, where the attendance of the students who have been
attending the class recently counts (since, say, the students who are
still enrolled but haven't attended recently are those who have lost
interest in the course and decided to drop out). When the lecturer
says Everyone is present" in this discourse context, 'everyone' refers
to every student who has been attending regularly, and the
proposition expressed is the one that every student who has been
attending recently is present. That is, since the speaker shares with
the addressees a particular communicative situation, she expresses
what she wants to say in a way that is clear and specific enough for
the purpose of the present communication.
The context change in this sense means that, because the goal or
topic of communication or one of the assumptions in the present
communicative situation changes, what the speaker wants to say
takes a different form, i.e., it is expressed by a different sentence, or
what the speaker says has a different content. Let us think of the
following scenario. The lecturer who says Everyone is present" to
her students meets later a departmental secretary who tries to
identify dropouts or dropouts to be. When the secretary asks the
lecturer about the attendance of the students in her course, the
lecturer, who understands the secretary's purpose of asking the
question, says, Not everyone was present. Alice wasn't there.
Actually she attended the first couple of lectures and hasn't come
since then". Although the lecturer says Everyone is present" and,
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later says Not everyone was present", she does not have a
contradictory belief. In the first discourse context, the lecturer
refers to every student who has been attending recently by
everyone', and expresses the proposition that every student who
has been attending recently is present. This is because, in this
discourse context, the importance is whether or not everyone who
should be present is present, excluding those who have seemingly
dropped out. In the second discourse context, on the other hand,
the lecturer refers to every student who is still enrolled as everyone',
and expresses the proposition that not every student who is enrolled
is present. This is because, in this discourse context, the important
thing is whether or not there are any students who are enrolled
but do not attend the course (and have dropped out or are likely to
drop out). A specific interpretation of a part or the whole of the
sentence is given in a particular discourse context because of its
communicative nature, and, therefore, in a different discourse
context, a certain interpretation is not valid or another interpretation
is given. This is another sense of context sensitivity.
If there are two types of context, i.e., the deictic context and the
discourse context, and, correspondingly, two senses of context
sensitivity, it is not surprising that these two senses of context
sensitivity are rather different, and, therefore, discourse context
sensitive expressions do not pass the sensitivity tests which deictic
context sensitive expressions do. It is, however, an important
question why these rather different situations are described as a
context, and how these types of context are related. We will try to
give an answer to these questions in Section 3.
Another criticism to Contextualisms made by Cappelen and
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Lepore is that if, as Radical Contextualists claim, every expression is
context sensitive, it is difficult to imagine how people succeed in
communicating with each other, as they actually do. This is an
important criticism of contextualism. This is basically the issue of
explaining the nature of communication by sign: how is it possible
to communicate meanings by means of signs, whose use is not the
same each time? If the criticism is interpreted this way, however,
Cappelen and Lepore's Speech Act Pluralism is subject to the same
criticism. We cite here again their idea of Speech Act Pluralism:
No one thing is said (or asserted, or claimed, or . . .) by any
utterance: rather, indefinitely many propositions are said,
asserted, claimed, stated. What is said (asserted, claimed,
etc.) depends on a wide range of facts other than the
proposition semantically expressed. It depends on a
potentially indefinite number of features of the context of
utterance and of the context of those who report on (or think
about) what was said by the utterance. (Cappelen and
Lepore 2005: 4)
If Cappelen and Lepore's claim about Speech Act Pluralism is right,
how do people succeed in communicating with each other? If what
is said, asserted, or claimed depends on a potentially indefinite
number of features of the context, how can the speaker and the
addressee know what is said? Cappelen and Lepore criticise
Contextualisms by saying:
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The simple idea is this: If RC were true, it would be
miraculous if people ever succeeded in communicating
across diverse contexts of utterance. But there are no
miracles; people do succeed in communicating across diverse
contexts of utterance with boring regularity. So, RC isn't
true. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 123)
We can, however, equally criticize Cappelen and Lepore by saying, If
Speech Act Pluralism were right, it would be miraculous if people
ever succeed in communicating in the context whose features are
potentially indefinite". We try to tackle this problem of
communication by analysing the two kinds of context from an
interactive perspective.
Cappelen and Lepore clarify a rather limited concept of context
from a rather limited perspective: a speech situation at a particular
spatio temporal location that specifies the person, object, time, and
place to which indexical／deictic expressions refer. The context in
this sense, the deictic context, exists as a background of uttering a
sentence, and its information specifies the propositional／truth
conditional content of the sentence. To see the context in this way is
to see it as a feeding context: the context feeds indexical／deictic
expressions with referents.
It is also true that we say what we say in the way we say it
because we interpret the speech situation where we are: who we
speak to, what topic we are communicating about, what is the
purpose of the present communication, and so on. The context in
this sense, the discourse context, is the situation with particular
communicative characteristics, which affects what we say. This
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discourse context can be seen as a feeding context: the context feeds
an utterance with an interpretation. This idea, however, causes a
serious problem of interpretation. Since we grasp the nature of the
present discourse context only heuristically, it is difficult to explain
how we know what is said by the utterance.
A less problematic concept for the discourse context is a
breeding context: the discourse context breeds an interpretation or
interpretations. When a speaker utters something to a particular
addressee in a particular speech situation, the speaker has some
assumptions about how her／his utterance is taken by the addressee
on the basis of discourse contextual elements: who the addressee is,
what topic the speaker and the addressee are communicating about,
and what the purpose of the present communication is. There are
different discourse contexts which give different interpretations to
the one and the same utterance. For example, in one discourse
context, the speaker's utterance is taken as a mere suggestion to
the addressee because of the social superiority of the addressee,
and, in another, it is taken as strong advice to the addressee because
of the speaker's expertise.
If there are two kinds of context, i.e., the deictic context, which is
a spatio temporal location where a particular speaker utters a
sentence to a particular addressee, and the discourse context, which
guarantees a certain interpretation of the utterance, successful
communication is the case in which the speaker and the addressee
share, in the deictic context, a discourse context which breeds a
certain interpretation of the utterance. If so, language must be
equipped with a mechanism by which the speaker indicates, and
specifies or insinuates the discourse context that breeds a particular
― ―44
interpretation of the utterance. A performative formula (Austin
1962a) seems to be a prototypical case of communication in this
sense. We develop this idea in the following section.
3 Explicit performatives and two kinds of context
3.1 Austin and contextualism
In this section, we clarify the two kinds of context and explain
communication by describing the process by which an explicit
performative sentence is uttered and a corresponding illocutionary
act is performed. Before doing so, we discuss Austin's speech act
theory and Austinian contextualism.
Austin's speech act theory (Austin 1962a) makes a clear contrast
with the standard speech act theory proposed thereafter, which is
based on intentionality (Searle 1969, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1983, and 1989,
Searle and Vanderveken 1985, and Back and Harnish 1979). Sbis
(2001) summarizes the standard speech act theory as follows:
Since Searle (1969: 46 49), the illocutionary act has generally
been conceived as the act a speaker successfully performs
when, uttering a sentence with a certain intention in certain
circumstances, he or she gets the hearer to understand his or
her intention. The speaker's communicative intention
determines what illocutionary act he or she should be taken
to perform and therefore what illocutionary force his or her
utterance may have. (Sbis 2001: 1795)
While the standard speech act theory purports to explain how the
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speaker's communicative intention is expressed and communicated,
Austin's speech act theory purports to explain linguistic actions as
the total speech act in the total speech situation" (Austin 1962a: 148).
Recently Austin's legacy has been re evaluated by Sbis : Sbis (2001)
examines Austin's concept of illocutionary effects and, in using
them, develops a theoretical framework in which mitigation
phenomena are explained; Sbis (2006) re evaluates the importance
of locutionary acts, which have been replaced by utterance acts (in
Searle 1969), and shows the possibility of describing a linguistic
action without relying on propositions. Oishi (2007) also re analyzes
Austin's felicity conditions and clarifies the elements of the context
by describing felicitous and infelicitous performances of illocutionary
acts.
Cappelen and Lepore (2005) call Austin a Radical Contextualist.
However, it isn't accurate to say Austin is a Radical Contextualist in
the sense that Cappelen and Lepore (2005) use the term. Cappelen
and Lepore (2005: 32) give the following excerpt from Austin (1962b)
to show Austin is a Radical Contextualist:
If you just take a bunch of sentences . . . impeccably
formulated in some language or other, there can be no
question of sorting them out into those that are true and
those that are false; for . . . the question of truth and falsehood
does not turn only on what a sentence is, nor yet on what it
means, but on, speaking very broadly, the circumstances in
which it is uttered. Sentences are not as such either true or
false. (Austin 1962b: 110 11)
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This, however, seems only to show that sentences themselves cannot
be either true or false as statements are. The same point is made in
another work by Austin:
. . . it is a fashionable mistake to take as primary (The
sentence) S" is true (in the English language)'. Here the
addition of the words in the English language' serves to
emphasize that sentence' is not being used as equivalent to
statement', so that it precisely is not what can be true or
false. (Austin 1961: 121)
However, if Austin's theory is a kind of contextualism, what
kind of contextualism can it be? We would like to claim that in his
version of contextualism Austin establishes a special relationship
between an utterance and the context. The speaker expresses a
particular meaning by uttering a sentence, while indicating the
present speech situation, i.e., the deictic context, as a context in
which the utterance is interpreted in a particular way. For example,
to communicate something by uttering a declarative sentence is not
only to describe a certain state of affairs, but also to indicate the
deictic context as a discourse context in which describing the state
of affairs in that way is interpreted as, say, a warning. Austin (1962a)
says:
It has come to be seen that many specially perplexing words
embedded in apparently descriptive statements do not serve
to indicate some specially odd additional feature in the
reality reported, but to indicate (not to report) the
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circumstances in which the statement is made or
reservations to which it is subject or the way in which it is
to be taken and the like. To overlook these possibilities in
the way once common is called the descriptive' fallacy . . . .
(Austin 1962a: 3)
To communicate then is at least partially to indicate, in the deictic
context, a discourse context in which describing a state of affairs in
a certain way is interpreted in a particular way, say, performing a
certain illocutionary act with a certain strength. We see a prototype
of this type of communication in illocutionary acts performed by
explicit performatives, which we discuss in the following section.
3.2 Explicit performatives and two kinds of context
Explicit performatives have a unique position in speech act theory.
Although, in Austin (1962a), they are prototypical examples for
clarifying the concept of speech acts, the standard intention based
speech act theory does not explain them satisfactorily. The following
are Austin's original examples of explicit performatives:
(E. a) I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)'-as
uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.
(E. b) I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth'-as uttered when
smashing the bottle against the stem.
(E. c) I give and bequeath my watch to my brother'-as occurring
in a will.
(E. d) I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.' (Austin 1962a: 5)
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Austin says:
In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence
(in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to
describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to
be doing, or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it. (Austin
1962a: 6, emphasis in text)
Searle, on the other hand, describes how performatives work as
follows:
We found that it was impossible to derive the performative
from the assertion because the assertion by itself wasn't
sufficient to guarantee the presence of the intention in
question. The difference between the assertion that you
promise and the making of a promise is that in the making of
a promise you have to intend your utterance as a promise,
and there is no way that an assertion by itself can guarantee
the presence of that intention. (Searle 2001[1989]: 105)
As a solution to this problem, Searle says:
The solution to the problem came when we saw that the
self guaranteeing character of these actions derives from the
fact that not only are these utterances self referential, but
they are self referential to a verb which contains the notion
of an intention as part of its meaning, and the act in question
can be performed by manifesting the intention to perform
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them. (Searle 2001[1989]: 105)
This explanation still falls short of explaining how performatives
work. When I say I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth" in the
appropriate circumstances, I certainly name the ship (and the ship
has been named and it is the Queen Elizabeth), rather than just
manifesting my intention of naming the ship. This is the whole point
of explicit performatives. There is a great gulf between doing
something and manifesting the intention of doing it.
Another problem with this explanation is that it is not clear
whose intention one is manifesting. Searle says, they [performative
utterances] are self referential to a verb which contains the notion of
an intention as part of meaning", but the performative sentences
cannot have an intention to perform the act. The only possible
interpretation is that, by uttering a performative sentence, the speaker
manifests her intention to perform the act. If so, there isn't much
difference between performative utterances and non performative
utterances: in uttering a performative sentence, the speaker manifests
her intention to perform an illocutionary act, while, in uttering a
non performative sentence, the speaker expresses her intention to
perform an illocutionary act by way of saying something, as Searle
explains by means of the concept of indirect speech acts (Searle
1975).
A different explanation can be given for the mechanism of how
performatives work. In uttering an explicit performative, the speaker
indicates and specifies the present speech situation through
specifying the present communicative move, i.e., the present
illocutionary act. For example, in uttering the sentence, I name
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this ship the Queen Elizabeth", the speaker indicates the present
speech situation and specifies it as the speech situation of naming.
The present speech situation is a situation in a particular spatio
temporal location in which a particular speaker and a particular
addressee exist, that is, the deictic context in our sense. The speech
situation specified by explicit performatives is the discourse context.
In uttering the sentence, I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth", the
speaker indicates the deictic context in which she addresses a
particular addressee or addressees, and specifies it as the discourse
context of naming. So, when the illocutionary act of naming is
successful, not only the act is counted as naming, i.e., the ship in
question is named the Queen Elizabeth, but also the discourse context
is defined as that of naming.
The deictic context is indicated by means of deictic expressions
such as I', you', and this'. In referring to a particular person by I'
or you', a particular spatio temporal situation where the person is
the present speaker or the present addressee, i.e., the deictic context,
is indicated. Through referring to a particular object by this', a
particular spatio temporal situation where the object is identified
as an object which is close to the speaker, i.e., the deictic context, is
indirectly indicated. The deictic context is also indicated by hereby':
a communicative move, i.e., an illocutionary act, is referred to by
hereby', and a situation in a particular spatio temporal location
where the move／act takes place, i.e., the deictic context, is
indicated.
Explicit performatives are interesting cases because expressing
a meaning, that is, specifying the present act, and specifying the
discourse context which guarantees the meaning／act occur at the
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same time in one utterance. In other utterances, specifying or
insinuating a certain discourse context occurs by way of, say,
describing a certain state of affairs in a certain way. For example,
by saying You are a damn fool", the speaker indicates the discourse
context of insulting.
In the following section, we will explain what elements the
context consists of.
3.3 Illocutionary acts and the discourse context
In the former section, we said that to perform an illocutionary act is
to indicate the deictic context and to specify it as a certain discourse
context. We have to explain the sense of specify" before we go
into the discussion of the context.
When we focus on illocutionary acts performed by explicit
performatives, especially so called institutional ones, to utter a
performative sentence in the appropriate circumstances itself
seems to perform an illocutionary act. For example, to utter the
sentence I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth" in the appropriate
circumstances is in itself to perform the act of naming. However, if
it is the case, it is puzzling how uttering the sentence I name this
ship the Queen Elizabeth", that is, uttering a certain string of words
structured by grammatical rules in English, has such power to name
the ship. Austin discusses this point (Austin 1962a: 9 10), and, to
explain how performatives work, he, on the one hand, describes
appropriate circumstances for performing an act, i.e., the felicity
conditions (Austin 1962a: 13 38), and, on the other hand, clarifies the
sense of performing a speech act by distinguishing illocutionary
acts from locutionary and perlocutionary acts (Austin 1962a: 91 151).
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The power of performing an act can be explained by the
interaction between the speaker who makes a communicative move
(to the addressee) of indicating the deictic context and specifying it
as a certain discourse context, and the addressee who makes a
reciprocal move (to the speaker) of accepting the discourse context
in the deictic context. That is, in specifying the present utterance as
an illocutionary act of naming or promising, the speaker specifies
the deictic context as the discourse context of naming or promising,
and, when this move is accepted as such by the addressee, the
deictic context has become the discourse context specified, which
accompanies certain conventional effects. So, when we say that the
speaker specifies the deictic context as a certain discourse context,
we do not mean that the speaker unilaterally creates a certain
discourse context: illocutionary acts are (or fail to be) understood,
agreed, and completed by the addressee, and, as a result, the
conventional effects are (or fail to be) achieved. That is, a certain
discourse context is identified and agreed by the speaker and the
addressee in the deictic context, where the communicative value of
the present utterance is fixed, associated conventional effects are
achieved, and communicative moves to follow are expected. This is
the source of power of the illocutionary act.
In analyzing illocutionary effects, Sbis (2001) explains an
interactive aspect of performing an illocutionary act in Austin's
model. Sbis (2001) says that the illocutionary act is associated
with three different kinds of effect:
(i) The securing of uptake,
(ii) The production of a conventional effect,
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(iii) The inviting of a response or sequel.
These effects are explained as follows:
Effect (i) amounts to bringing about the understanding of
the meaning and the force of the utterance and, unless it is
achieved, the illocutionary act is not actually carried out.
Effect (ii) amounts to the bringing about of a state of affairs
in a way different from bringing about a change in the
natural course of events: the act of naming a ship Queen
Elizabeth' makes it the case that this is the ship's name, and
that referring to it by any other name will be out of order,
but these are not changes in the natural course of events.
Effect (iii) amounts to inviting a certain kind of subsequent
behavior; if the invitation is accepted, a certain further act
by some of the participants follow. (Sbis 2001: 1796)
These three kinds of effects can be interpreted in terms of the
process by which the present utterance, which specifies the deictic
context as a certain discourse context, is understood by the addressee
(effect (i)), and the deictic context has become the discourse context
specified, and corresponding conventional effects are achieved (effect
(ii)), and the specified context causes a further communicative
move (effect (iii)).
Let us briefly discuss the elements of the context. Austin's
felicity conditions give us a general picture of how an illocutionary
act can be felicitous／infelicitous. As I discussed elsewhere (Oishi
2007), the ways in which an illocutionary act becomes felicitous／
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infelicitous seem to show elements of the context. That
is, if, as we claim, to perform an illocutionary act is to indicate the
present speech situation and specify it as a particular discourse
context, then the ways in which such an attempt becomes
inappropriate show how specifying the deictic context as a certain
discourse context fails, which seems to show in turn the elements
of the context specified.
Let us look at Austin's felicity conditions:
(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure
having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to
include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in
certain circumstances, and further,
(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case
must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular
procedure invoked.
(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both
correctly and
(B.2) completely.
(Г.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by
persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the
inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part
of any participant, then a person participating in and so
invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts
or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct
themselves, and further
(Г.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.
(Austin 1962a:14 15)
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Violations of the conditions (A.1) and (A.2) are described as
'misinvocations', in which the purported act is disallowed (Austin
1962a: 18). The felicity conditions (A) seem to describe elements of
the discourse context in which a certain act is allowed. The felicity
condition (A.1) shows the element of the discourse context in which
the speaker and the addressee share linguistic and socio cultural
conventions according to which to utter certain words in certain
circumstances by certain persons is counted as performing a certain
speech act, which accompanies a certain conventional effect. The
felicity condition (A.2) shows another element of the discourse
context in which there are persons and circumstances specified by
linguistic and socio cultural conventions.
Violations of the second type of condition in (B.1) and (B.2) are
described as misexecutions', in which a purported act is vitiated
(Austin 1962a: 18). That is, the felicity conditions (B) seem to
describe the elements of the deictic context in which a certain act
is actually executed by the speaker's performance and the addressee's
response. The felicity condition in (B.1) describes the element in
which the speaker actually utters something to construct the event
of performing a particular act. That is, the speaker creates a
performance as an illocutionary act in the deictic context. The
felicity condition in (B.2) exposes another aspect of the deictic
context, in which the speaker's performance is completed by the
addressee's performance as a response.
A violation of the felicity conditions (Г.1) and (Г.2) is described
as an abuse', in which the professed act is hollow (Austin 1962a: 18).
The felicity conditions (Г ) seem to describe the elements of
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specifying the deictic context: the speaker is responsible for
specifying the deictic context as a certain discourse context, and
indicates a certain thought／feeling／intention as her own (Г.1), and,
when applicable, commits herself to conducting a certain action
subsequently (Г.2)7.
So, when the speaker successfully performs a certain
illocutionary act by uttering a sentence, the utterance is a linguistic
artefact created in the deictic context. This is one sense of context
sensitivity, i.e., deictic context sensitivity. The utterance is also
evaluated in term of linguistic and socio cultural conventions and
associated persons and circumstances. This is another sense of
context sensitivity, i.e., discourse context sensitivity. In other
words, through the specification of the present illocutionary act,
two aspects of the context of communication are recognized. One is
the deictic context, i.e., a speech situation in a particular spatio
temporal location, where the present speaker makes a communicative
move to the present addressee in uttering something. Austin's
felicity conditions (B) indicate this aspect of context. The other
aspect is the discourse context, by which the communicative move
in the deictic context is interpreted. Austin's felicity conditions (A)
indicate this aspect of context. Austin also describes another aspect of
communication by the felicity conditions (Г): the speaker expresses
a certain thought／feeling／intention and a commitment as her own.
4 Conclusion
In the present paper we have clarified two different concepts of
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7 For detailed discussion, see Oishi (2007).
context, that is, the deictic context and the discourse context, and
specified two separate senses of context sensitivity. We defined the
deictic context as the speech situation in a certain spatio temporal
location. Deictic context sensitivity means, in its narrow sense, that,
when the determination of the propositional content of the sentence
involves the specification of the referents of indexical expressions,
such as I', you', here', and now', the referents of the indexical
expressions vary from one speech situation to another. The discourse
context, on the other hand, is defined as the speech situation with
communicative characteristics which specifies／guarantees how the
utterance is interpreted. Discourse context sensitivity means, in its
narrow sense, that the specific interpretation valid in one type of
speech situation is not valid in other types of speech situation.
We discussed Cappelen and Lepore's (2005) criticism of
Contextualism in terms of two points. The first point concerns the
fact that two senses of context sensitivity are rather different kinds,
and the second point concerns the possibility／impossibility of
communication: if every expression is context sensitive, how do
people ever succeed in communicating with each other? To answer
this question, we described, using explicit performatives as
prototypical cases, the communicative mechanism of specifying a
meaning through specifying the present communicative move. That
is, the speaker specifies the meaning she expresses while indicating
the deictic context and specifying it as a certain discourse context.
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